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THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT’S 
GRAVITY JURISPRUDENCE AT TEN 
MARGARET M. DEGUZMAN∗ 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In taking stock of the work of the International Criminal Court (the 
“ICC” or the “Court”) in its first ten years, one of the most important 
questions to ask is how the Court has approached the task of determining 
which cases fall within its mandate. How the judges approach this task 
will have significant consequences for the ICC’s developing role in the 
global legal order. A narrow approach to the Court’s mandate would limit 
the institution’s ability to achieve the important goals to which it aspires, 
in particular, the prevention of serious crimes. On the other hand, a broad 
approach could conflict with widely held expectations of the Court’s role, 
and thus undermine the institution’s legitimacy.1  
The ICC was established to adjudicate “the most serious crimes of 
concern to the international community as a whole.”2 This category is 
given content in the ICC’s Rome Statute, which limits the Court’s 
jurisdiction to war crimes, crimes against humanity, genocide, and 
aggression.3 Except for aggression, which remains a work in progress, the 
Rome Statute defines each of these crimes,4 and the “Elements of Crimes” 
provide further specifics.5 Nonetheless, these documents leave the ICC 
judges significant discretion to determine which crimes are serious enough 
 
 
 ∗ Associate Professor, Temple University Beasley School of Law; Ph.D. Candidate, National 
University of Ireland Galway; J.D. Yale Law School; M.A.L.D. Fletcher School of Law and 
Diplomacy; B.S.F.S. Georgetown University School of Foreign Service. Thanks to Megan Cribbs for 
excellent research assistance. 
 1. For an exploration of this issue, see Margaret M. deGuzman, Choosing to Prosecute: 
Expressive Selection at the International Criminal Court, 33 MICH. J. INT’L L. 265 (2012) [hereinafter 
deGuzman, Choosing to Prosecute]. Moreover, an inclusive understanding may undermine the system 
of state sovereignty that remains the bedrock of the international system. Margaret M. deGuzman, 
How Serious Are International Crimes? The Gravity Problem in International Criminal Law, 15 
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 18 (2012) [hereinafter deGuzman, How Serious Are International 
Crimes?].  
 2. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, pmbl., July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90 
[hereinafter Rome Statute]. 
 3. Id. art. 5(1)(a)-(d). 
 4. The crime of aggression was originally undefined in the Rome Statute. See id. art. 5(2). The 
Assembly of States Parties has since adopted an amendment defining the crime, but the Court will not 
be able to exercise jurisdiction over aggression until 2017 at the earliest. See I.C.C. Doc. RC/Res. 6 
art. 15 ter (June 11, 2010).  
 5. Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 9. 
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to merit the Court’s attention. In particular, the Statute requires the judges 
to deem inadmissible cases within the Court’s jurisdiction that are “not of 
sufficient gravity to justify further action by the Court.”6 This requirement 
is known as the gravity threshold for admissibility. 
This Essay analyzes the Court’s early jurisprudence interpreting the 
gravity threshold for admissibility. It argues that the threshold, while 
useful in garnering support for ratification of the Rome Statute, now seems 
destined to play a minor role in determining the ICC’s reach. While there 
are multiple possible explanations for this development,7 an important 
doctrinal cause identified in the jurisprudence is that the gravity threshold 
for admissibility is in tension with the Rome Statute’s provisions 
regarding jurisdiction. At least with regard to the admissibility of cases,8 
the judges have concluded that interpreting the gravity threshold to 
exclude certain types of defendants or crimes from the Court’s reach 
would amount to an impermissible revision of the Court’s jurisdiction. To 
avoid this outcome, the judges have developed a flexible multi-factor 
approach to the gravity threshold that enables them to justify admitting 
virtually any case within the Court’s jurisdiction.  
The Essay concludes by arguing that, in light of the tension between 
admissibility and jurisdiction, the judges are right to relegate the gravity 
threshold to a minor role in determining the cases the Court adjudicates. 
To the extent the judges seek to limit the ICC’s reach, they should do so 
by interpreting the Court’s jurisdictional provisions directly rather than 
through the back door of admissibility. 
II. GRAVITY THRESHOLD JURISPRUDENCE 
Although the ICC’s founders agreed that the institution’s mandate 
should be limited to the most serious crimes of global concern, they did 
not share a common vision of which crimes fit that description.9 Some 
states and many members of the influential community of non-
governmental organizations envisioned a criminal court for the promotion 
 
 
 6. Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 17(1)(d).  
 7. See deGuzman, How Serious Are International Crimes?, supra note 1. 
 8. As discussed below, with regard to the gravity of situations—geographic and sometimes 
temporal spaces in which crimes have been committed—the judges have left the door open for a 
broader application of the gravity threshold. 
 9. For a more detailed discussion of the controversy regarding which crimes should fall within 
the jurisdiction of the Court, see Margaret M. deGuzman, Gravity and the Legitimacy of the 
International Criminal Court, 32 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1400, 1416–25 (2009). 
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of human rights norms with a broad subject matter jurisdiction.10 Other 
states were more protective of national jurisdiction and felt the ICC’s 
reach should be restricted to crimes on the scale of the Holocaust, the 
Rwandan genocide, and ethnic cleansing in the former Yugoslavia.11 The 
Rome Statute bridges this divide, in part, by including a gravity threshold 
for admissibility.12 The Statute leaves the concept of gravity ambiguous, 
allowing states with divergent visions of the Court’s role to believe, or at 
least hope, that their vision will prevail.  
The Rome Statute thus relegates to the judges the task of interpreting 
the concept of gravity and, in particular, deciding how the gravity 
threshold relates to the Statute’s provisions regarding jurisdiction. 
Procedurally, the question comes before the judges at various stages. First, 
when the Prosecutor seeks to initiate an investigation of his or her own 
accord, the judges must determine whether the cases likely to be 
prosecuted in the situation meet the gravity threshold.13 Second, when a 
state party or the United Nations Security Council (“Security Council”) 
refers a situation to the Court, the Prosecutor can decide not to investigate 
or prosecute based on insufficient gravity.14 In that case, the referring 
entity can request judicial review of the decision, and the judges can ask 
the Prosecutor to reconsider.15 Third, once the Prosecutor brings a case, 
the accused or a state with jurisdiction may challenge the admissibility of 
the case based on insufficient gravity, or the judges may raise the issue of 
their own accord.16 The gravity threshold is thus applied to situations in 
the first instance and later to particular cases. 
In the first ten years of the Court’s operation, the judges have 
interpreted and applied the gravity threshold for admissibility on several 
occasions. These early decisions, while limited in number and scope, 
nonetheless indicate that the judges are inclined to require only minimal 
gravity for admissibility beyond what is inherent in the Rome Statute’s 
provisions regarding jurisdiction. 
 
 
 10. For further discussion and support, see id. at 1419–20. 
 11. Id. 
 12. The drafters also included an optional “threshold” for war crimes that provides that the Court 
has jurisdiction over war crimes “in particular” when they are “committed as part of a plan or policy or 
on a large scale.” Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 8.  
 13. Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 15. 
 14. Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 53(1)–(2). 
 15. Id. art. 53(3).  
 16. Id. art. 19. 
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A. Lubanga/Ntaganda Arrest Warrant Decision 
The most important holding regarding the gravity threshold for 
admissibility—indeed the only holding from the Appeals Chamber—came 
in the Court’s first case. In the situation in the Democratic Republic of 
Congo, the Prosecutor applied to Pre-Trial Chamber I (“PTC I”) for arrest 
warrants for two men accused of having committed war crimes: Thomas 
Lubanga and Bosco Ntaganda. Although the Prosecutor did not raise the 
question of admissibility, PTC I decided that to issue an arrest warrant, it 
must first ascertain whether the proposed case is admissible.17 The 
Chamber thus considered the gravity threshold for admissibility on its own 
motion.  
PTC I began by noting that since the Court’s subject matter jurisdiction 
is already limited based on gravity, the gravity threshold must require 
something additional to the seriousness inherent in the definitions of 
crimes.18 Accordingly, the Chamber termed the gravity threshold the 
“additional gravity threshold.”19 This additional threshold, according to 
PTC I, has three components. First, it requires that the conduct at issue in 
the case be systematic or large-scale.20 In this regard, the Chamber stated 
that “due consideration” must be given to the “social alarm” the conduct 
has caused.21 Second, the accused must be among the most senior leaders 
in the situation under investigation.22 Third, the accused must be among 
those most responsible for the crimes alleged.23 To justify the second and 
third prongs of the gravity threshold test, the judges relied heavily on the 
idea that focusing the Court’s attention on the most responsible senior 
leaders would best promote the Court’s central goal of deterring serious 
crimes.24 After applying this test, the Chamber issued an arrest warrant for 
 
 
 17. Prosecutor v. Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Decision Concerning Pre-Trial 
Chamber I’s Decision of 10 February 2006 and the Incorporation of Documents into the Record of the 
Case against Mr. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, annex I, ¶ 18 (Feb. 24, 2006), http://www.icc-cpi.int/ 
iccdocs/doc/doc236260.PDF.  
 18. Id. ¶ 41. 
 19. Id. ¶ 46 (emphasis added).  
 20. Id. 
 21. Id.  
 22. Id. ¶ 50. 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. ¶¶ 53–54.  
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Lubanga25 but declined to issue one for Ntaganda on the grounds that he 
was not one of the senior leaders most responsible for the crimes at issue.26  
The Prosecutor appealed the decision and the Appeals Chamber 
reversed, disagreeing with PTC I in virtually every aspect of its holding.27 
First, the Appeals Chamber held that a determination of admissibility is 
not required to issue an arrest warrant.28 In fact, the Appeals Chamber 
determined that Pre-Trial Chambers should only rarely exercise their 
discretion to consider admissibility at this stage because the defendant is 
not yet represented before the Court.29 In light of this procedural basis for 
reversing PTC I’s decision, the Appeals Chamber did not need to address 
the lower court’s gravity threshold test.30 Nonetheless, the Appeals 
Chamber decided to do so, stating that the Pre-Trial Chamber’s 
interpretation of the gravity threshold “could have an impact on the Court 
as a whole.”31 
The Appeals Chamber found fault with each aspect of PTC I’s gravity 
threshold test. First, the Appeals Chamber determined that PTC I’s 
requirement that the conduct be systematic or large-scale blurs the 
distinction between war crimes and crimes against humanity since the 
former have such a requirement, but the latter do not.32 Second, the idea of 
“social alarm” is too subjective to be an appropriate basis for 
admissibility.33 Finally, limiting admissibility to the most responsible 
senior leaders would undermine rather than promote deterrence since it 
would leave all other perpetrators of international crimes beyond the 
ICC’s reach.34 The application for an arrest warrant against Ntaganda was 
thus remanded to the Pre-Trial Chamber, which granted the application.35  
 
 
 25. Id. ¶ 75. 
 26. See Situation in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Case No. ICC-01/04-169, Judgment on 
the Prosecutor’s Appeal Against the Decision of Pre-Trial Chamber I entitled “Decision on the 
Prosecutor’s Application for Warrants of Arrest,” art. 58, ¶¶ 62–65 (July 13, 2006), http://www.icc-
cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc183559.pdf (describing sealed section of PTC I decision). 
 27. See generally id. 
 28. Id. ¶¶ 41–45. 
 29. Id. ¶¶ 52–53. 
 30. Some subsequent decisions have treated the Appeals Chamber’s gravity threshold analysis as 
dictum. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Omar Hassan Ahmad A Bashir, Case No. ICC-02/05-01/09, Decision 
on the Prosecution’s Application for a Warrant of Arrest Against Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, ¶ 48 
n.51 (Mar. 4, 2009), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc639096.pdf.  
 31. Situation in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Case No. ICC-01/04, ¶ 54.  
 32. Id. ¶¶ 70–71.  
 33. Id. ¶ 72. 
 34. Id. ¶ 73–79. 
 35. Id. ¶ 92. 
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These decisions brought to light the tension between the gravity 
threshold and the Rome Statute’s jurisdictional provisions. PTC I’s 
proposed interpretation of the gravity threshold as limiting admissibility to 
cases involving systematic or large-scale criminality by the most 
responsible senior leaders amounted to a modification of the Court’s 
subject matter and personal jurisdiction. If the Court categorically declines 
to exercise jurisdiction over smaller scale crimes by less responsible 
perpetrators on the basis of admissibility, it would be meaningless to assert 
that such cases are still within the Court’s jurisdiction.  
Having rejected this categorical approach, the Appeals Chamber 
declined to explain how the gravity threshold should be interpreted. Only 
one judge, George Pikis, wrote separately to express his view on this 
question. According to Judge Pikis, the gravity threshold for admissibility 
should be interpreted very narrowly to exclude only the most insignificant 
war crimes.36 For Judge Pikis, the Rome Statute’s jurisdictional provisions 
mandate this interpretation—the gravity threshold cannot be interpreted in 
a way that significantly limits the Court’s jurisdiction.37 
B. Abu Garda Confirmation of Charges Decision 
After the Appeals Chamber issued this decision, the gravity threshold 
did not receive serious consideration again until four years later when PTC 
I confirmed charges against Bahar Idriss Abu Garda in the Darfur 
situation. Abu Garda was charged in connection with an attack that killed 
twelve peacekeepers and wounded eight others. In addressing whether the 
case met the gravity threshold, PTC I again emphasized that the threshold 
requires something additional to the gravity inherent in the Court’s subject 
matter jurisdiction.38 This time, however, rather than interpret the 
threshold to include implicit limitations on the Court’s personal and 
subject matter jurisdiction, PTC I took a more flexible approach. First, the 
gravity threshold did not exclude prosecution of any particular type of 
defendant.39 With regard to crimes, PTC I adopted a view advanced in the 
Prosecutor’s policy statements that the gravity of crimes should be 
assessed according to both quantitative and qualitative factors.40 The 
 
 
 36. Id. ¶ 40 (Judge Pikis, Separate and Partly Dissenting).  
 37. Id. ¶ 41.  
 38. Prosecutor v Bahar Idriss Abu Garda, Case No. ICC-02/05-02/09, Decision on the 
Confirmation of Charges, ¶ 30 (Feb. 8, 2010), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc819602.pdf. 
 39. Id. ¶¶ 28–34.  
 40. Id. ¶ 31. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol12/iss3/9
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quantitative element refers to the number of victims while the qualitative 
aspect concerns “issues of the nature, manner and impact” of the crimes.41  
To elaborate on the qualitative component of the gravity threshold, the 
Court turned to the Rules of Procedure and Evidence related to sentencing. 
Gravity determinations for sentencing require the judges to consider “the 
extent of damage caused, in particular, the harm caused to victims and 
their families, the nature of the unlawful behaviour and the means 
employed to execute the crime.”42 The judges adopted these factors for 
gravity threshold determinations as well.43  
This flexible, factor-based approach makes it reasonably easy for the 
judges to justify admitting virtually any case within the Court’s 
jurisdiction. For most cases, at least some of the factors will support a 
finding of sufficient gravity. The Abu Garda case provides an apt 
illustration. The case involved such a low number of direct victims that it 
could be considered insufficiently grave to meet the threshold on that 
basis. PTC I found the case admissible, however, by privileging the 
qualitative factors over the quantitative.44 The Chamber held that despite 
the low number of direct victims, the case met the gravity threshold 
because the crimes seriously impacted the broader community by causing 
a reduction in peacekeeping forces in the area.45  
C. Kenya Article 15 Authorization Decision 
The next time the judges gave substantial consideration to the gravity 
threshold was in relation to the Prosecutor’s request for authorization to 
investigate the situation of post-election violence in Kenya. Prior to this 
request, the Court had not faced the question of whether a situation, as 
opposed to a case, met the gravity threshold. All prior situations had been 
referred to the Court by a state or the Security Council and, consequently, 
the Prosecutor did not require authorization to investigate. This was also 
the first time that Pre-Trial Chamber II (“PTC II”) was called upon to 
 
 
 41. Id. 
 42. Rules of Procedure and Evidence, U.N. Doc. PCNICC/2000/1/Add.1, Rule 145(1)(c) (2000). 
 43. Abu Garda, Case No. ICC-02/05-02/09, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, ¶ 31. 
 44. Id. ¶¶ 33–34. 
 45. Id. ¶¶ 33–34. The Pre-Trial Chamber ultimately declined to confirm the charges against Abu 
Garda on grounds of insufficient evidence. Id. ¶¶ 215–16. In another case, the Pre-Trial Chamber 
adopted and applied the gravity threshold analysis in Abu Garda without further analysis or 
elaboration. Prosecutor v. Abdallah Banda Abakaer Nourain and Saleh Mohammed Jerbo Jamus, Case 
No. ICC-02/05-03/09, Corrigendum of the “Decision on the Confirmation of Charges,” ¶ 27–28 (Mar. 
7, 2011).  
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apply the gravity threshold. The decision includes several important 
holdings regarding the gravity threshold. 
First, PTC II agreed with PTC I that, as a matter of statutory 
construction, the gravity threshold must be read to require something 
additional to the gravity inherent in the crimes within the Court’s 
jurisdiction.46 However, PTC II went on to observe that the purpose of the 
threshold is to prevent the Court from adjudicating “peripheral cases.”47 
PTC II thus seems to adopt Judge Pikis’ view that the gravity threshold is 
quite low.  
Second, PTC II held that when determining whether a situation is 
sufficiently grave to merit investigation, the Court should not evaluate the 
gravity of the situation as a whole as the Prosecutor had proposed, but 
rather should consider the gravity of the cases likely to be brought in the 
situation.48 This interpretation significantly narrows the inquiry. 
Finally, PTC II adopted a two-part analysis for determining whether 
the likely cases in a situation meet the gravity threshold. First, with regard 
to the crimes likely to be prosecuted, PTC II followed the approach of 
PTC I in the Abu Garda confirmation decision, looking to both 
quantitative and qualitative factors to assess whether the potential crimes 
are sufficiently grave.49 Second, with regard to potential defendants, PTC 
II held that the groups likely to be investigated must include those who 
bear the greatest responsibility for the crimes alleged.50 Applying these 
gravity factors, PTC II held that the Kenya situation is sufficiently grave to 
merit investigation.51 
PTC II’s second requirement, somewhat surprisingly, appears to revive 
PTC I’s holding in the Lubanga arrest warrant decision that the gravity 
threshold requires a certain kind of defendants—those most responsible.52 
However, because the question in the context of situational gravity 
concerns the cases the Prosecutor is likely to bring, rather than cases 
 
 
 46. Situation in the Republic of Kenya, Case No. ICC-01/09, Decision Pursuant to Article 15 of 
the Rome Statute on the Authorization of an Investigation into the Situation in the Republic of Kenya, 
¶ 56 (Mar. 31, 2010), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc854287.pdf. 
 47. Id.  
 48. Id. ¶ 58. 
 49. Id. ¶ 62. 
 50. Id. ¶ 60. 
 51. Id. ¶¶ 188–200.  
 52. In the only other determination of “situational gravity,” PTC III followed PTC II’s approach 
in the Kenya case to determine that the Cote D’Ivoire situation also meets the gravity threshold for 
admissibility. Situation in Côte d'Ivoire, Case No. ICC-02/11, Decision Pursuant to Article 15 of the 
Rome Statute on the Authorisation of an Investigation into the Situation in the Republic of Côte 
d'Ivoire, ¶¶ 201–206 (Oct. 3, 2011), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1240553.pdf.  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol12/iss3/9
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actually before the Court, the requirement does not run counter to the 
Rome Statute’s jurisdictional provisions in the same way. That the 
investigation must include those most responsible does not mean that 
those less responsible cannot also be prosecuted.  
The effect of this requirement, therefore, is not to limit the Court’s 
exercise of jurisdiction, but rather to limit the prosecution’s freedom to 
shape investigations. Under this test, until the Prosecutor can demonstrate 
that the investigation will target those suspected of being most responsible 
for the crimes in a given situation, investigation will not be authorized. For 
most situations this will have little practical effect since the Prosecutor 
usually has every incentive to investigate those most responsible. There 
may be instances, however, in which the Prosecutor is unable to include in 
the investigation those most responsible for the crimes—for example, 
when the leaders have fled or died. If the Prosecutor nonetheless wishes to 
investigate, perhaps to demonstrate the Court’s commitment to 
prosecuting the particular kinds of crimes committed in the situation, this 
requirement suggests the Court may not authorize investigation.  
D. Ali Confirmation of Charges Decision 
PTC II has also addressed the gravity threshold in the Kenya situation 
in relation to a particular case. At the confirmation of charges stage, 
Mohammed Hussein Ali argued that the conduct with which he was 
charged constituted “police inaction” and that such inaction is 
insufficiently grave to be admissible as a matter of law and fact.53 He 
further asserted that only cases against principal or direct perpetrators meet 
the gravity threshold for admissibility.54 In response, PTC II held that 
nothing in the Rome Statute precludes conviction for omissions and that to 
interpret the gravity threshold as excluding cases against indirect 
perpetrators would contradict the Rome Statute’s provision regarding 
superior responsibility.55 PTC II pointed out that it would be contrary to 
the object and purpose of the Rome Statute to interpret the gravity 
threshold in a way that reduces the subject matter jurisdiction of the 
Court.56 The Chamber then applied the gravity factors elaborated in the 
 
 
 53. The Prosecutor v. Francis Kirimi Muthaura, Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta and Mohammed 
Hussein Ali, Case No. ICC-01/09-02/11, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges Pursuant to Article 
61(7)(a) and (b) of the Rome Statute, ¶¶ 40–41 (Jan. 23, 2012), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/ 
doc1314543.pdf. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. ¶¶ 46–47. 
 56. Id. ¶ 46. 
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earlier cases to hold that the case against Ali was sufficiently grave.57 The 
crimes were committed in two locations over several days and “resulted in 
numerous deaths and brutal injuries, massive displacement and sexual 
violence.”58 Additionally, the manner of commission of the crimes was 
particularly brutal.59 
III. WHAT IS LEFT OF THE GRAVITY THRESHOLD FOR ADMISSIBILITY?  
With regard to the admissibility of cases, the early jurisprudence 
demonstrates the difficulty of identifying a role for the gravity threshold 
that does not run counter to the Rome Statute’s provisions concerning 
jurisdiction. The Appeals Chamber rightly rejected PTC I’s early effort to 
give specific, categorical content to the gravity threshold. Limiting 
admissible cases to those involving the senior leaders most responsible for 
systematic or large-scale crimes would have effectively restricted the 
Court’s personal and subject matter jurisdiction.  
In light of the tension between the Rome Statute’s admissibility and 
jurisdiction provisions, the judges have appropriately concluded that the 
gravity threshold should play a minor role in determining the cases the 
Court adjudicates. Since the Appeals Chamber ruling in Lubanga, the 
judges interpreting and applying the threshold have placed no limit on the 
kinds of defendants who meet the threshold and have developed a flexible, 
multi-factor approach to assessing the gravity of crimes.60 By including a 
range of quantitative and qualitative factors, the judges have made it 
reasonably easy to justify admitting virtually any case within the Court’s 
jurisdiction. Cases of war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide 
will almost always present some features of gravity, whether in terms of 
the number of victims, the nature of the crimes, or the broader impact on 
 
 
 57. Id. ¶ 49–50. 
 58. Id. ¶ 49.  
 59. Id. ¶ 49. Trial Chamber III passed up an opportunity to address the gravity threshold in 
response to an admissibility challenge by Jean Pierre Bemba-Gombo in the situation in Central African 
Republic. Bemba-Gombo argued that his role as military commander made the case insufficiently 
grave and that his case did not meet the standard the prosecutor had followed in declining to 
investigate crimes against British soldiers in Iraq. The Trial Chamber rejected the challenge on the 
procedural ground that the issue was resolved when the Pre-Trial Chamber held the case was 
sufficiently grave at the confirmation of charges stages and the defendant did not appeal. Prosecutor v 
Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08, Decision on the Admissibility and Abuse of 
Process Challenges, ¶ 249 (June 24, 2010), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc899684.pdf. 
 60. See, e.g., The Prosecutor v Bahar Idriss Abu Garda, Case No. ICC-02/05-02/09, Decision on 
the Confirmation of Charges, ¶¶ 28–34 (Feb. 8, 2010); Situation in the Republic of Kenya, Case No. 
ICC-01/09, Decision Pursuant to Article 15 of the Rome Statute on the Authorization of an 
Investigation into the Situation in the Republic of Kenya, ¶¶ 55–62 (Mar. 31, 2010). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol12/iss3/9
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the community. Indeed, it is difficult to imagine any case involving crimes 
against humanity or genocide that would fail to meet the threshold. To the 
extent the judges exclude any cases based on the gravity threshold, they 
will likely be, as Judge Pikis suggested, cases of small scale, isolated war 
crimes. Moreover, since the Prosecutor is unlikely to bring such cases to 
begin with, the threshold seems destined for relative obscurity, at least 
with regard to cases.  
The fate of the gravity threshold may be somewhat different with 
regard to the admissibility of situations, particularly when the Prosecutor 
seeks to initiate investigations proprio motu. In that context, the lower 
court judges revived the notion that the ICC should target those most 
responsible, at least to the extent of including them in the investigation. As 
the judges continue to develop the gravity jurisprudence in this area, they 
should bear in mind that in rare situations it may not be possible to 
investigate the most responsible perpetrators. Precluding the Prosecutor 
from proceeding under such circumstances may undermine the ICC’s 
goals, in particular the principal goal of crime prevention. Instead, a more 
flexible approach like the one that has emerged in the context of the 
gravity threshold for cases may be preferable.  
IV. CONCLUSION 
The Rome Statute gives no indication of what cases meet the gravity 
threshold or of how this requirement relates to the provisions regarding the 
Court’s jurisdiction. This ambiguity encouraged states with divergent 
views of the Court’s role in the world to support its creation. Now that the 
Court is operational, the judges have undertaken the task of interpreting 
and applying the threshold. PTC I’s early attempt to give significant 
meaning to the threshold brought to the forefront the tension between 
gravity as a basis for restricting the admissibility of cases and the Rome 
Statute’s grants of personal and subject matter jurisdiction to the Court. As 
a result, subsequent jurisprudence has interpreted the gravity threshold so 
loosely that judges will rarely have difficulty showing that the threshold 
has been met. At least with regard to the admissibility of particular cases, 
therefore, it seems likely that the gravity threshold will continue to play an 
insignificant role in the Court’s jurisprudence regarding the extent of its 
mandate. 
This outcome is appropriate. To the extent the judges see a need to 
cabin the reach of the ICC, they should do so directly by interpreting the 
Court’s subject matter jurisdiction, rather than via the ambiguous notion of 
gravity. Judge Kaul’s dissent in the ICC’s decision to admit the Kenya 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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situation provides an apt illustration. Judge Kaul did not believe the crimes 
committed in Kenya merited ICC adjudication.61 He reached this 
conclusion by interpreting the policy element of crimes against humanity 
more narrowly than the majority.62 Judge Kaul could have reached the 
same conclusion by invoking the gravity threshold. One of the elements of 
crimes against humanity under the Rome Statute that makes them 
sufficiently serious to concern the international community is that they are 
committed pursuant to an organizational policy. That policy makes it more 
likely that the crimes will result in significant harm and less likely that 
they will be prosecuted at the national level. By narrowly interpreting the 
policy requirement, therefore, Judge Kaul was essentially requiring a 
higher degree of gravity.63 
Judge Kaul’s decision to interpret the crime rather than rely on the 
gravity threshold to exclude the situation was the right one. To restrict the 
Court’s reach based on the gravity threshold for admissibility would 
obscure the important question of how far the ICC’s jurisdiction extends. 
Judge Kaul’s dissent serves to highlight the choices the international 
community must make as it continues to develop the notion of 
international criminal jurisdiction. Should crimes against humanity include 
widespread but loosely organized crimes or be limited to crimes organized 
at the state level or by state-like organizations? The ICC judges should 
continue to face such questions directly rather than avoid them by 
employing the ambiguous notion of gravity. 
 
 
 61. Situation in the Republic of Kenya, Case No. ICC-01/09, Decision Pursuant to Article 15 of 
the Rome Statute on the Authorization of an Investigation into the Situation in the Republic of Kenya, 
¶ 3 (Mar. 31, 2010) (Judge Kaul, Dissenting), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc854287.pdf. 
 62. Id.  
 63. See id. ¶ 53 (arguing that the majority’s “approach may expand the concept of crimes against 
humanity to any infringement of human rights” and that “a distinction must be upheld between human 
rights violations on the one side and international crimes on the other side, the latter forming the 
nucleus of the most heinous violations of human rights representing the most serious crimes of concern 
to international community as a whole”).  
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